Strange Career and the Need for a Second Reconstruction of the History of Race Relations by Kousser, J. Morgan
  1 
Strange Career and the Need for a Second Reconstruction  
of the History of Race Relations1 
 
I.  Ambitions 
 From the beginning, C. Vann Woodward wanted to change the world by uncovering the 
truth.  The remarkably ambitious goals of his doctoral dissertation, which eventually became 
Tom Watson, were not just to spotlight southern rebels -- proving that the South had never been 
solid, that it had a usable radical past, that the apparently timeless southern consensus had been 
shattered before, but also to find out what had gone wrong –  why his heroes had lost, what they 
had faced, and how they were flawed, so that readers could learn their lessons and perhaps avoid 
sharing their fate.2  The same public purposes, many of the same themes, the same faith – not 
that the truth will make you free; he was never blinded by that illusion; but the negative version 
of the platitude, that without the truth, we can never be free or equal – also pervade Reunion and 
Reaction, Origins of the New South, and especially The Strange Career of Jim Crow. 
 These days, historians have filed the book away, misunderstood its aims, forgotten or 
denied its alternatives.  Thus, Woodward’s first biographer, John Herbert Roper, haughtily 
 
1An earlier version of this paper was given at a session on “The Continuing Career of Jim 
Crow,” chaired by Sheldon Hackney, at the Southern Historical Association convention in 2005.  
I want to thank Vernon Burton for his many helpful comments. 
2C. Vann Woodward, Thinking Back: The Perils of Writing History (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana: LSU Press, 1986), 29-42; John Herbert Roper, C. Vann Woodward, Southerner 
(Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 75-79. 
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dismissed Strange Career as “most fatally flawed,” a book that “ignored racism by studying only 
legal formalism,” one whose implications for policy in the 1950s and 60s made it “most 
obviously dated in later years,” a work, therefore, whose “genius . . . was orchestration” – merely 
good timing.3  In an article commemorating the 50th anniversary of the book’s publication in the 
 
3Roper, C. Vann Woodward: A Southern Historian and His Critics (Athens, Georgia and 
London: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 29; Roper, C. Vann Woodward, Southerner, 194-
95, 198.  Ironically, Roper, a student of Joel Williamson, one of the chief critics of Strange 
Career, reads Strange Career as, in effect, prefiguring Williamson’s interpretation of southern 
race relations.  C. Vann Woodward, Southerner, 188-92.  According to Roper, Woodward saw 
segregation laws and the upsurge of lynching in the 1890s as an irrational expression of lower-
class white frustration with the economic depression of the decade, which caused them to 
scapegoat African-Americans, dragging formerly paternalistic aristocrats behind them in the Jim 
Crow movement.  But this is inconsistent with Woodward’s notion of a post-1890s “soured 
Populism,” his careful differentiation between members of the Populist party per se and 
Democrats like Ben Tillman and James K. Vardaman, who used racist tactics to combat 
opponents of the Democratic party, and his indictment of “progressives,” not 1890s Populists, as 
the authors of disfranchisement.  In his testimony before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary 
Committee on the renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 1981, for instance, Woodward remarked 
that “I think one of the great and pathetic ironies of our history is that the most reactionary period 
of racial legislation got tied with the name of ‘progressivism.’  That was the period when the 
great bulk of the discriminatory laws about voting and civl rights were put on the books . . .” 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the 
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Boston Globe, Stephen Kantrowitz remarked that “I’m not sure how important the book is for 
contemporary scholarship.  The scholarship on Jim Crow has mutated into something quite 
different.”  And Mark Smith patronized it as merely ornamental, remarking that “If ‘Strange 
Career’‘s arguments gradually lose historiographical purchase, at least it’ll keep alive an art form 
I sometimes worry is in danger of evaporating.”4 
 But Strange Career was no more a quaint decoration than it was merely a reinterpretation 
of history or just an effort to inspire public policy.  The book’s revisionism attracted enormous 
attention and provoked, for a long while, considerable research, research that is no longer stylish, 
though it is not yet finished.5   Yet there was another, larger, less apparent purpose of the work 
that has been only very partially fulfilled – the creation of a new field, the history of race 
relations, as Origins created the new field of the history of the Post-Reconstruction South.6 
 This paper sketches broad trends in the history of American race relations in works 
 
Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, First Session on Extension of the 
Voting Rights Act (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 2024. 
4Clay Risen, “Strange Career,” Boston Globe, July 17, 2005. 
5Two convenient introductions to a portion of Woodward’s “Jim Crow Thesis” are Joel 
Williamson, ed., The Origins of Segregation (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 
1968) and John David Smith, ed., When Did Southern Segregation Begin? (Boston and New 
York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2002). 
6This aim is most fully on view in Woodward’s essay “The Strange Career of a Historical 
Controversy,” in his American Counterpoint: Slavery and Racism in the North-South Dialogue 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 234-60. 
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published since 1955, as well as general trends in actual race relations since that year, in an 
attempt to understand what forces have shaped those two trends and to propose a Woodwardian 
reorientation of the field.  After Strange Career race relations history wandered for a time down 
a too-narrow path.  More recently, it has unfortunately veered off course, concentrating on racial 
identity, rather than racial interaction;7  on violence, rather than vital statistics;8 on personal, 
rather than public politics.9 Too many historians, in this field and others, have succumbed to the 
fin-de-siecle temptations of romanticism and intellectual despair, awarding everyone agency and 
denying anyone domination,10 and doubting the possibility of knowledge, while seemingly smug 
 
7E.g., Elizabeth Rauh Bethel, The Roots of African-American Identity: Memory and 
History in Free Antebellum Communities (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Eddie S. 
Glaude, Jr., Exodus!  Relgion, Race, and Nation in Early Nineteenth Century Black America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
8Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South 
from Slavery to the Great Migration (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2003), 8 spoke of “the paramilitary character of southern politics . . .” 
9Eschewing synthesis as reductionist and a focus on “the limitations Southerners 
endured” as itself limited, Edward L. Ayers’s The Promise of the New South: Life After 
Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), viii-ix emphasized “a more active 
and intimate history”of the period in southern history that its predecessor, Woodward’s Origins, 
had not considered “promising.” 
10Thus, Lawrence W. Levine, contended that “the most important intellectual 
breakthrough by historians in the past two decades” was their revised view of “the folk . . . as 
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in the assurance that they alone possess the truth.11  In contrast to Woodward’s emphasis on 
conflict and the possibility of change, many historians, often professed devotees of the political 
left, have ignored or dismissed distinctions between historical actors, promulgating an image of 
consensus in race relations that can only hamper effective action against discrimination.12   
 
actors in their own right who, to a larger extent than we previously imagined, were able to build 
a culture, create alternatives, affect the situation they found themselves in, and influence the 
people they found themselves among.”  Levine, “The Unpredictable Past: Reflections on Recent 
American Historiography,” American Historical Review, 94 (1989), 673.  He applied assertions 
about informal political power to slavery in “Clio, Canons, and Culture,” Journal of American 
History 80 (1993), 864:  “Blacks during and after slavery were engaged in the most serious game 
of politics and exerted power of many kinds – especially cultural power, the importance of which 
we are just now beginning to appreciate.” Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, 2-3, was concerned 
to a large extent with “how unfranchised and disfranchised people might conduct politics,” and 
he considered slavery constructed around “the fictions of domination and submission.” 
 The intensity of the struggles of African-Americans and women for the abolition of 
slavery and for their own enfranchisement and the all-out efforts of slaveholders and white and 
male supremacists to deny both groups equality suggest that historical actors put less stock in 
cultural power and more in institutionalized power than these historians later suggested.  
11See Kousser, “The New Postmodern Southern Political History,” Georgia Historical 
Quarterly, 87 (2003), 427-48. 
12The echoes of Ulrich B. Phillips’s “central theme of southern history” in Joel 
Williamson’s The Crucible of Race: Black-White Relations in the American South Since 
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Placing themselves outside the fray, historians in general, except those on the political right,13 
have largely retreated from efforts to change the minds that shape the institutional rules of racial 
interaction.  Some have voiced a despair about human nature so profound, and a conviction of 
the irrationality and unpredictability of human beings so deep as to paralyze efforts at racial or 
any other type of reform.14  Woodward initiated the field of comparative reconstruction.  It is 
now time for a second reconstruction of the field of race relations history. 
         
 
Emancipation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 247-48, are deafening: “Behind it all, 
in politics as well as in everything else, it was white unanimity against blackness, molded rigid in 
a white culture monolithic, total, and tight, that put the black man either down or out.” Indeed, 
Williamson, 317-18, says that Phillips’s chief flaw was that he believed whites had to struggle to 
maintain white supremacy.  Of course, Williamson condemned the alleged white consensus, 
while Phillips approved it. 
13Most prominently, Stephan Thernstrom and Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and 
White:  One Nation, Indivisible: Race in Modern America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1997); Abigail Thernstrom, Voting Rights – And Wrongs: The Elusive Quest for Racially Fair 
Elections (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2009). 
14Williamson, The Crucible of Race, 321:  “. . . all people are liable to be mistaken in 
their perceptions, and to do horrible things in consequence.”  Levine’s essay and book title, “The 
Unpredictable Past,” cloaks intellectual despair in cleverness.  If one cannot analyze the past, 
when we have a pretty good idea how things came out, how can one possibly analyze the present 
sufficiently to frame a course of reformative action? 
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II.  Propositions 
 
 Begun in research for the NAACP-LDF for Brown v. Board of Education, the short, but 
influential Strange Career  was composed on the cusp of change from the legally segregated to 
the legally desegregated South. Woodward’s guarded optimism about the future of race relations 
after Brown rested on four propositions – first, that institutions, not culture, had shaped southern 
race relations; second, that slavery and segregation were not equivalent, and that, more 
particularly, segregation had not immediately replaced slavery as a “natural” form of racial 
control or interaction; third, that the extreme domination of one race over the other was not 
inevitable, that there were “forgotten alternatives” to segregation and disfranchisement in the 
post-1877 South; and finally -- a proposition so fundamental as to remain unnoticed, perhaps 
even to Woodward, but which has emerged against the background of more recent static cultural 
treatments of the subject15 -- that race relations, like any other aspect of human relationships, 
could change and vary.    
 Strict, virtually uniform segregation was, Woodward asserted, the result of state and local 
 
15Williamson, Crucible of Race; David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and 
the Making of the American Working Class (London: Verso, 1991); Matthew Frye Jacobson, 
Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).  For critiques of whiteness studies, see Eric Arnesen, 
“Whiteness and the Historians’ Imagination,” International Labor and working-Class History, 
60 (2001), 3-32; Peter Kolchin, “Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America,” 
Journal of American History, 89 (2002), 154-73. 
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laws that regularized and policed previously untidy, frequently mixed, and in scattered instances, 
nearly egalitarian, if furtive, relations between people of different races.  Whereas party 
competition, especially, Woodward thought, between Populists and Democrats, tended to 
preserve black rights and status, white Democratic desires to end both partisan opposition and 
any shreds of racial equality prevailed only through law. 
 As the Civil Rights Movement intensified and then retrenched in the 20 years after 
Brown, and as national administrations moved from tepid support of black civil rights under 
Dwight Eisenhower, to enthusiastic co-optation under Lyndon Johnson, to politicized backlash 
under Richard Nixon, Strange Career went through three editions that mirrored the times.16  
Even more than in the first edition, the later versions emphasized changes that might lurch 
forward or backward and the profound difficulty of sustaining policies that benefitted minorities.  
At the time of the earlier classic, Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, it had seemed to 
many people of good will that all America needed to do to solve its race problem was for whites 
to recognize the inconsistency between racial discrimination and the egalitarian American 
Creed.17    
 But by 1974, it was clear to Woodward and nearly everyone else that ideological 
consistency was at best only a first step.  There is an Olympian despair about the third and last 
 
16Woodward’s next paragraph after discussing the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 
the Third Revised Edition begins: “For a very brief interval the optimists had things their way.”  
(Woodward 1974, 186) 
17Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1944), lxxi. 
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revised edition of Strange Career, as the decade after the passage of the two major national civil 
rights laws brought a seeming abandonment on the part of both blacks and whites of the 
nonviolent methods that inspired the movement for the laws and the integrationist ideals that 
both the movement and the laws embodied.  Victory over segregation was no sooner declared 
than it was reversed.  By the time of Milliken v. Bradley, the 1974 case that ended the possibility 
of metropolitan desegregation in the North,18 the federal courts and executive branch, which had 
wielded the chief tools to unravel racial inequality, had apparently become the engines of its 
reinforcement. 
 Yet ironically, the uneven decline of discrimination during the generation after the first 
edition of Strange Career, so depressing to Woodward and those who shared his hopes, had 
subtly supported his position. The abrupt demise of segregation in public accommodations  
(restaurants, buses, hotels and motels, etc.)19 after the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
should have convinced everyone that the core of Woodward’s argument about the dependence of 
segregation on law had been validated, and the surge in African-American voter registration after 
the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act should have added more evidence.20  The fact that 
school, housing, and employment discrimination took longer to diminish21 should have 
undermined cultural explanations of discrimination, which argued that discrimination is all of a 
 
18418 U.S. 717. 
19These trends will be discussed at somewhat greater length later in this essay. 
20Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in the 
American South (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), 188. 
21Wright, Sharing the Prize, 105-82. 
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piece, independent of governmental action.  Events after the 1955 first edition of Strange Career, 
in other words, should have been seen to offer broad support for its findings, for they proved 
once again that no system of race relations -- not slavery, not segregation, not integration -- is 
“natural,” and that each has sub-systems (e.g., political, social, economic) that do not necessarily 
develop in sync with each other.  All systems and sub-systems depend on institutional rules and 
capabilities; all vary and change.  Ultimately, all are about power.  Race relations, the events of 
the 1950s, 60s, and 70s demonstrated, are politically constructed. 
 
III.  Evaluations 
 
 But historians ignored the lessons of the present -- unfortunately, in my view22 -- in 
assessing what became known as “the Woodward thesis.”23  The first scholars to test it examined 
 
22While distorting the analysis of past events in order to justify policies or points of view 
in the present represents bias, reexamining explanations of past events in light of more recent 
events may be just another form of comparative history, deepening and/or calling into question 
analyses of the past.  In this instance, the quite different, uneven trajectories of discrimination in 
different areas of social, political, and economic life, as well as the stark regional and urban-rural 
differences in those trajectories, casts significant doubt on the causal sufficiency of cultural 
explanations of earlier patterns of discrimination. 
23As a hypothesis, it could be clarified, tested, amended, extended, or rejected, and it 
attracted the attention of scholars who sought to perform any of these actions.  By contrast, in the 
postmodern idiom, which Woodward did not find attractive, an “interpretation” can only be 
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small, isolated, largely static examples, rather than making large, explicitly comparative studies 
of change, though larger historical studies began to appear in the 1980s,24 and this approach still 
lives, especially in the work of Rebecca J. Scott, Anthony Marx, and Richard Valelly.25  The 
initial articles and monographs typically focused on a single state and looked for evidence of the 
 
catalogued and added to other, incommensurable, compatible, irrefutable points of view about 
the past.  The controversy over the Jim Crow Thesis was itself productive of much historical 
knowledge and learning, and it might serve as a paradigm about how historical scholarship ought 
to develop. 
24The foremost of these comparative studies agreed broadly with Woodward’s approach, 
though it summarily, without detailed discussion, concluded that post-Reconstruction race 
relations were less open than Woodward suggested.  Discrimination “depends comparatively 
little on individual attitudes and much more on the racism that is ingrained in institutions. . . . 
Segregation is created and enforced by power.  It is a political phenomenon.”  John W. Cell, The 
Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the 
American South (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 8, 17 for the quotations and 82-
102 for the more specific evaluation. 
25Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba After Slavery (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005); Anthony W. Marx, Making Race and Nation: A 
Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); Richard M. Valelly, The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black 
Enfranchisement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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extent of segregation before the passage of state Jim Crow laws.26  That evidence was scattered, 
instead of systematic; what constituted a “test” was difficult to agree upon; and whether 
segregation should be considered an inflexibly intertwined social system or a practice that might 
differ in various social, political, and economic realms, was not resolved, and in many cases, not 
even acknowledged.   
 Consider, first, the evidence.  If one found few newspaper stories or letters or diary 
entries or court cases on railroad or streetcar or hotel segregation during the 1870s and 80s in a 
southern state, did that mean that integration had been unthinkable, or that it had been 
unremarkable, that segregation had been unchallenged, or that it had not needed to be 
challenged?  How was one to know whether African-Americans had ridden in the smoking cars 
of trains because they were forced there, or because they could not afford first-class tickets?  
How was it possible, on such evidence, to gauge what was usual and what was unusual?  Was 
there a difference between the extent of segregation as indexed by each of the three statistical 
measures of central tendency – the mean (the arithmetic average), the median (the number in the 
middle of a set of ordered numbers), and the mode (the most common number)?  If such 
concepts seem impossibly precise in summarizing such a vague state of evidence, does that in 
itself not  suggest caution in blanket assertions about the general tendencies of social relations? 
 And what if it was easier to be precise about the degree of discrimination in one area of 
 
26The best, which actually preceded the publication of Strange Career, was George 
Brown Tindall’s nuanced South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900 (Columbia, S.C.: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1952), 291-302, which carefully traced the development of segregation 
over time and distinguished between different areas of social and political life. 
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race relations than another?  In particular, although it might be impossible on current evidence to 
determine just how segregated trains or hotels or other public accommodations were before the 
imposition of explicit segregation laws, it has become quite possible since the development of 
“ecological regression” in the 1950s, to recover voting turnout rates and racial voting patterns for 
candidates and parties in southern elections from the 1860s on.  If the Jim Crow thesis includes 
suffrage restriction, which Woodward certainly believed, and if the evidence from statistical 
studies of southern voting in the Post-Reconstruction South is both much more solid than that 
about public accommodations and more clearly supportive of a later date for the perfection of the 
system of discrimination and an institutional means for accomplishing that perfection, which it 
certainly is, then ought we not to conclude that the Jim Crow thesis is alive and well?27 
 Second, reflect on the tests. Should Woodward be read as claiming that the typical 
experience of African-Americans until the late 19th century was integrated, or only that their 
experience of segregation was much less uniform than it later became?  Thus, Charles E. Wynes 
adopted both interpretations, concluding that “the most distinguishing factor in the complexity of 
social relations between the races [in Virginia], was that of inconsistency.  From 1870-1900, 
there was no generally accepted code of racial mores.  It is perhaps true that in a majority of the 
cases where a Negro presumed to demand equal treatment – in hotels, restaurants, theatres, and 
bars, and even on the railroads – he was more likely to meet rejection than acceptance.”28  The 
 
27See Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the 
Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 1974). 
28Wynes, Race Relations in Virginia, 1870-1902 (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of 
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most influential challenge to Woodward’s position was by Joel Williamson on the entirely 
atypical – more heavily black, more dependent on cotton, with the weakest tradition of 
democratic political competition -- state of South Carolina.  Williamson read Woodward’s thesis 
as an assertion about average experiences in what Williamson paints as a society that was nearly 
static in the 19th century, making his  rejection of the Woodward thesis virtually automatic.29  
Others, most notably John William Graves, in his marvelous book on the understudied state of 
Arkansas, read the thesis as an assertion about variation and found that the evidence supported 
it.30 
 Third, is the Jim Crow thesis about specific social behavior or general culture or even 
more vaguely, about thought or feeling?  Woodward was admittedly not altogether clear about 
this, but Williamson was: “The real color line,” he declared, “lived in the minds of individuals of 
 
Virginia Press, 1961), 68-83, excerpted in Williamson, Origins of Segregation, 20-31, quotes at 
20-21.  Note the careful and tentative nature of Wynes’s judgment: “perhaps . . . more likely . . .”  
Strangely, Williamson glosses this excerpt as “challeng[ing] the extent of fluidity in race 
relations” that Woodward had highlighted in Strange Career.  Williamson, Origins of 
Segregation, 20. 
29Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction, 1861-
1877 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 274-99. 
30Graves, Town and Country: Race Relations in an Urban-Rural Context, Arkansas, 
1865-1905 (Fayetteville, Arkansas and London: University of Arkansas Press, 1990).  Similarly, 
see Joseph H. Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow: Tennessee Race Relations in the 1880s 
(Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1976). 
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each race, and it had achieved full growth even before freedom for the Negro was born.  Physical 
separation merely symbolized and reinforced mental separation.”31  This forthright statement 
encapsulates the view of what might be called the “Berkeley School of the history of race 
relations,” encompassing Williamson, who received his Ph.D. thesis at Berkeley, and Leon 
Litwack and Lawrence Levine, both of whom long taught at that branch of the University of 
California.  In this cultural-intellectual view, all whites felt “separated” from African-Americans, 
and this fact mattered much more than the form of behavior in which the mental separation was 
manifest – slavery, segregation, or even integration.  Echoing Williamson, Litwack titled his 
major work on black history Trouble in Mind32 (my emphasis.)  Although evidence about racial 
thought or feeling can be measured at least somewhat systematically even before attitude surveys 
began,33 Williamson, Litwack, and others made no attempt to do so. 
 The Berkeley school emphasized violence and discounted any cross-racial alliances.  
Where Woodward had memorably recounted the gathering of hundreds of Georgia Populists to 
protect a black Populist minister, Rev. Seb Doyle, during Tom Watson’s 1892 campaign for 
 
31After Slavery, 298.  Or as he put it in The Crucible of Race, p. 318, “Race, in brief, is a 
problem of the mind . . . .” 
32Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1998). 
33See, for example, Kousser, “‘The Supremacy of Equal Rights’: The Struggle Against 
Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” Northwestern University Law Review 82 (1988), 970-72. 
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Congress,34 Williamson spotlighted mobs of white southern men, displaced from their roles as 
breadwinners by the depression of the 1890s, seeking to reestablish control over their restive 
wives by lynching alleged black rapists.  Their actions were completely irrational and utterly 
unpredictable: “Anytime, anyplace, white people in large crowds might suddenly fall into a 
frenzy and lynch a black person.”35  What would falsify such a contention – a demonstration of 
the instrumental employment of violence, such as Woodward’s example of Democratic attempts 
to stop a black preacher from speaking in favor of a white Populist, or perhaps the observation 
that interracial lynching, however horrible, was much less prevalent than other forms of violence 
or crime, and that patterns in it could be discerned?36  Somewhat less excitedly Leon Litwack 
emphasized the “terror, intimidation, and violence” that whites employed to “doom 
Reconstruction” and the “violence and the fear of violence” that “helped to shape black lives and 
personalities” from then through the Great Migration to the North during World War I, and he 
completely discounted any instances of white political “collaboration” with blacks, whether 
under the banner of Populism or Republicanism.37  But Reconstruction-era African-Americans 
 
34Woodward, Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938), 239-
40. 
35Williamson, “Wounds, Not Scars: Lynching, the National Conscience, and the 
American Historian,” Journal of American History, 83 (1997), 1228. 
36Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern 
Lynchings, 1882-1930 (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1995). 
37Litwack, Trouble in Mind, xiii, xvi, 221-22. 
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had an amazing ability to overcome violence,38 and partisan politics in which blacks played 
major roles continued to be vigorous until laws and constitutional amendments brought it to an 
end after 1890.39 
 Although eschewing explicit references to social psychology or sociology, the Berkeley 
School often reduced race relations to some assertedly more fundamental conflict, usually sexual 
or perhaps sexual-economic, for which evidence was purely rhetorical, if it existed at all.  
Wielding only quotations from novelist Thomas Nelson Page and unenfranchised feminist 
radical Rebecca Latimer Felton, Litwack asserted that the motive for the disfranchisement of 
black voters was sexual: “To bar the black man from the polling place was to bar him from the 
bedroom.  If blacks voted with whites as equals, they would insist on living and sleeping with 
whites as equals, and no white Southerner could contemplate such degradation. . . . The issue 
was not black political power,” he concluded40 without examining the plentiful evidence that the 
issue was, indeed, black and white oppositional power.41  Relying primarily on his own 
untestable intuitions, Williamson postulated even more grandiosely that “the Negro was a 
scapegoat in the turn-of-the-century South, that whites were having difficulty coping with a 
burgeoning industrial-commercial-political order as it impacted upon a social-psychological-
sexual order earlier generated, and that in that crisis they used the Negro in constructing an 
 
38Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second 
Reconstruction (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 23-24. 
39Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics. 
40Litwack, Trouble in Mind, 221. 
41Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, especially 238-46. 
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illusion that they were indeed managing their lives in important ways.”42  What skein of social 
facts, paired with what all-powerful social psychological theory, would be necessary to validate 
such assertions?  Compared to such cultural mystification, the Jim Crow Thesis was a model of 
clarity and testability. 
 Fourth, how are different spheres of social relations connected, and how should 
contradictory trends in the different spheres weigh for and against the Jim Crow Thesis?  Was 
school segregation, apparently almost universal in the South after emancipation, except in New 
Orleans, evidence for the pervasiveness of segregation, or, because segregation was less strictly 
adhered to in other spheres, was school segregation actually evidence that separation required 
legal enforcement?  Were black churches, so comforting to southern whites as evidence that 
“they” wanted to be with “their own kind,” instead supportive of the connection between systems 
of racial interaction and power?  That is, in spheres of activity in which blacks could attain 
power only in segregated institutions, such as churches, they preferred segregation; whereas, in 
institutions where they could enjoy power only by mixing with whites, such as legislatures, they 
preferred integration – the common denominator, more compelling than social preferences, being 
the search for power.  Focusing on schools and churches, Williamson depicted segregation as 
“the Negro’s answer to discrimination,” though he also noted that the black political leadership 
 
42Williamson, The Crucible of Race, 318.  Some years later, the economic edge of the 
scapegoat thesis was sliced off, leaving only gender: “ . . .the real war, the essence of the 
conflict, concerned gender, not race, and . . . lynching and even disfranchisement, segregation, 
and proscription had more to do with relations between white men and white women than with 
relations between blacks and whites. . . .” Williamson, “Wounds, Not Scars,” 1253. 
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insisted on integrated public accommodations by law.  He apparently did not consider these two 
judgments contradictory.43  
 How did the Jim Crow thesis apply to the political sphere, in which blacks remained 
active participants long after schools and churches, and some railroads and streetcars were 
segregated?  How did disfranchisement, which was not a “horizontal,” but a “vertical” division, 
more like exclusion than it was like segregation, fit into the assessment of Strange Career?  
What was the implication of the fact that poor white suffrage was restricted, as well?  What of 
the economic sphere, where only in large cities could there be a semblance of a separate black 
economy?  In small towns and rural areas of the South, whites were much more economically 
powerful than blacks, but the two races were interdependent and incompletely segregated.  In 
southern cities, small neighborhood clusters of racial concentrations only became concentrated 
into large racial housing blocs after the 1890s, and they were often enforced by explicitly racial 
zoning restrictions.  Should one count the early minimal segregation as evidence of racial 
preferences for separation or the delayed appearance of “colored towns” and racial zoning 
ordinances evidence for the Jim Crow Thesis?44  
 The rural and urban contrast in the economy is part of what might be termed the principal 
paradox of segregation: social segregation was more characteristic of “modern” than of 
“traditional” sectors of society, of urban, rather than rural areas, and thus, during the antebellum 
 
43After Slavery, 278-79. 
44For a discussion and references to many other metropolitan studies, see Thomas W. 
Hanchett, Sorting Out the New South City: Race, Class, and Urban Development in Charlotte, 
1875-1975 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 116-144. 
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period, of the North, rather than of the South.45  Scholars have often drawn misleading  
implications from the modernity of segregation.  One possible conclusion is that segregation was 
natural and did not need laws to establish it.  But the conclusion is wrong because the 
observation is incomplete.  The first state to take comprehensive action against legal segregation 
– i.e., to repeal laws against racial intermarriage, to end railroad segregation, and to mandate 
school integration -- was the most modern antebellum commonwealth, Massachusetts.46   By 
1890, all of the ex-free states with any appreciable number of African-Americans except Indiana 
had followed the Bay State’s example by repealing their “black laws” and passing public 
accommodations and school integration laws.47   
 Although the correlation between modernization and segregation was negative in the 19th 
and much of the 20th century North (the more modern the society, the less segregated), it seems 
to have been positive in most of the 19th century South, as well as in South Africa.48  What are 
the implications of this fact?  First, segregation is merely one form of racial discrimination, and 
often not the harshest.  Slavery and poorly paid agricultural wage labor usually required constant 
monitoring and strict authoritarian control.  Second, there is only a tenuous connection between 
 
45A convenient short introduction is in the selections by Richard C. Wade and Leon 
Litwack in Williamson, ed., Origins of Segregation, 81-95. 
46Kousser, “‘Supremacy of Equal Rights.” 
47Kousser, “‘The Onward March of Right Principles’: State Legislative Actions on Racial 
Discrimination in Schools in Nineteenth-Century America,” Historical Methods, 35 (2002), 177-
204. 
48Cell, Highest Stage of White Supremacy. 
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segregation, slavery, or any other system of discrimination, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, an undifferentiated racism of ideas, either informal or highly theorized.  The harshest and 
most fervent and frequent expressions of racism came from those whites who lived with the 
largest proportion of African-Americans, but segregation, as well as anti-segregation 
movements, were products of the usually whiter, more cosmopolitan cities, where less benighted 
racial attitudes were much more common.49  Perhaps demonstrations of the intricate connections 
between segregation and socioeconomic modernization will finally convince historians to accept 
what social psychologists have been demonstrating since the 1930s – that the connections 
between racial attitudes and behavior are weak.50  Historians should cease to treat evidence of 
 
49Although there were no direct, comprehensive measures of racial attitudes before the 
1940s, V.O. Key’s Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), 5, 
famously found the that in the first half of the 20th century, voters in the “Black Belt,” the 
counties over about half black, had “the deepest and most immediate concern about the 
maintenance of white supremacy,” and more direct survey evidence gathered more recently 
confirms that the relationship between racial environment and white racial attitudes in the South 
continues strong.  For a summary, see James M. Glaser, “Back to the Black Belt: Racial 
Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South,” Journal of Politics, 56 (1994), 21-41. 
50Social psychological research on attitudes about groups increasingly relies on implicit, 
rather than explicit measures of attitudes and finds correlations between implicit and explicit 
measures themselves, and between either and behavior rather complex.  See, for a recent review, 
Gerd Bohner and Nina Dickel, “Attitudes and Attitude Change,” Annual Review of Psychology, 
62 (2011), 391-417.  The most important implication for historical research on race-related 
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cultural attitudes about race relations as a perfect proxy or unproblematic cause of discriminatory 
behavior. 
 Third, the view of southern segregation as primarily an urban phenomenon adds support 
to Woodward’s position, for southern cities, again with the exception of New Orleans, grew 
large only in the late 19th century.  Laws were more necessary to enforce social norms in cities 
than in rural and small-town societies.  Outside of cities, informal enforcement mechanisms, 
from forms of torture to less dramatic expressions of disapproval, were usually sufficient to 
maintain a racial hierarchy. 
 
IV.  Emendations 
 The Jim Crow Thesis stimulated not only efforts to affirm or deny it, but also attempts to 
amend or add to it.  Following suggestions by Joel Williamson, Howard Rabinowitz viewed 
segregation as a positive step forward for African-Americans, an alternative both to slavery and 
to total exclusion from such institutions as public schools,51 though not as desirable as the full 
integration that Radical Republicans preferred and that seven southern legislatures endorsed, at 
least for public accommodations, during Reconstruction.  Interpreting Woodward as speaking 
primarily about public accommodations, Rabinowitz granted that there was noticeable 
integration in at least second-class railway cars before the passage of Jim Crow laws and that 
 
behavior is that it may well differ from explicit, seemingly-related statements.  
51Rabinowitz, Race, Ethnicity, and Urbanization: Selected Essays by Howard N. 
Rabinowitz (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1994), which contains a 
complete bibliography of the controversy over Strange Career, up to that point, 26-28. 
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blacks continued to vote and hold office until legal disfranchisement, but contended that in 
almost all other areas of southern life in the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction life, 
especially schools, segregation was the predominant pattern.  On even less evidence, he 
speculated that segregation and disfranchisement were not as total and rigid after the passage of 
the nominally strict laws as Woodward had assumed.52 
 The Rabinowitz Exclusion Thesis suffers from many of the problems already outlined.  It 
treats all areas of behavior as highly correlated, while admitting that some were exceptions.  It 
has no explicit index of practice in any area, and unlike the Jim Crow Thesis, which only needs a 
few examples to demonstrate a lack of uniformity, the Rabinowitz Thesis must demonstrate 
some central tendency, which would seem to require measurement.  It does not fit politics at all, 
for in this sphere, integration is the only mode of participation, and exclusion comes not only at 
the beginning, in the antebellum period and the Black Codes, but also at the end, in 
disfranchisement.  It applies primarily to cities, for segregation was impossible in rural areas and 
even small towns.  Yet the South was overwhelmingly rural from 1865 to 1900, areas containing 
4,000 or more people constituting only 13.5% of the population of the South Central states and 
19.6% of that of the South Atlantic states in 1900.53    
 But Rabinowitz’s was not the only important amendment.  Curiously for an Arkansan, 
Woodward had asserted, without any very systematic recital of evidence, that “the newer states 
[i.e., those further west, which had come into the Union later] were inclined to resort to Jim 
Crow laws earlier than the older commonwealths of the seaboard, and there is evidence that 
 
52Race, Ethnicity, and Urbanization, 28-31. 
53Twelfth Census, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), lxxxvi. 
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segregation and discrimination became more generally practiced before they became law.”54   
John William Graves, however, suggested that if the sub-regional observation is true, it 
represents a genuine Woodwardian irony, the earlier passage of Jim Crow laws in the “newer 
states” representing a backlash against a more fluid race relations there, as compared with the 
more settled pattern of discrimination in the eastern commonwealths.  At least in Arkansas, 
African-Americans, Graves concluded, “may have received more humane treatment and enjoyed 
more real opportunity” because society was “less structured” and “social relationships were less 
constrained by inherited mores, at least in their rapidly developing cities and towns.”55  
 But there are other possible and interesting extensions of the Jim Crow thesis, especially 
if it is considered more broadly as one concerned with the connections between institutions and 
patterns of race relations in many periods.  Reversing Woodward’s time frame – he argued from 
19th century history that the pattern of race relations in the 20th century could change; I will argue 
from trends in the 20th and 21st centuries that patterns of race relations in the 19th need to be 
reexamined – may prove productive. 
 
V.  Fluctuations 
 
54Woodward, Strange Career, 41. 
55Graves, Town and Country, 228.  The unsettled nature of race relations in frontier 
societies is a recurrent theme from William Faulkner’s Absolom, Absolom! (New York: Random 
House, 1936), one of Woodward’s favorite books, to Ira Berlin’s Many Thousands Gone: The 
First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
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 Trends in the world outside the academy have always affected the way race relations 
history is written, and they should, because the recent past may provide sufficiently different 
conditions as to throw light on previous events.  When Woodward gave the lectures that became 
Strange Career, the southern system of segregation and discrimination seemed completely 
intertwined, tightly bound.  Extreme pessimists believed that it had always been that way and 
always would be.  Extreme optimists believed that if one string were loosened, the whole fabric 
would quickly unravel.  They were both wrong.  Some sections of weaving were denser than 
others – and they were not the ones that many people thought. 
 That since 1954, segregation and discrimination have ebbed and flowed in quite different 
rhythms in different areas of social, political, and economic life, as well as in different regions 
and demographic areas (cities, suburbs), suggests three major observations. I will initially assert 
these observations, then provide skeletal evidence for and discussion of them: First, the tight 
matrix of segregation and discrimination in the first half of the 20th century in the South was 
unusual, not typical.  Discrimination in societies is more often uneven, fractured, disorganized.  
It is the unusually-connected structure that made the Jim Crow Era distinctive and that needs to 
be accounted for, and pure prejudice will not suffice as an explanation.  Prejudice guides, rather 
than drives discrimination.  It is the steering wheel, not the engine.  Second, some of the other 
common explanations for the existence, growth, or persistence of discrimination should not be 
maintained, in light of recent American experiences.  In particular, the post-Brown era casts 
doubt on the importance of sexual or psychosocial causes of discrimination.  Third, the pattern of 
variations and trends, and broad, tentative explanations of those fluctuations suggest a 
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framework for analyzing changes in race relations. 
 How have post-Brown race relations varied in different facets of society?  After an 
intense, but comparatively short struggle bracketed by the Montgomery bus boycott and the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, segregation in public accommodations (restaurants, hotels, theaters, and the 
like), the symbolic heart of Jim Crow, completely collapsed.56  By 1965, integrated groups could 
eat at restaurants and stay in motels in the deepest parts of the Deep South without attracting 
overt hostility. In the summer of 1965, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, where I was 
interning, held a very integrated conference on implementation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in 
Demopolis, in the heart of Black Belt Alabama, incidentally putting Section 2 of that Act into 
active practice in the surrounding area without the least sign of an incident.  As someone who 
had grown up in the segregated South, I was amazed at the instant integration of traditional 
southern hospitality. 
 Black political rights and power followed a different course.  Political segregation ended 
abruptly, in a sense, with the abolition of the white primary in 1944, but it took innumerable 
registration drives and largely unsuccessful political campaigns, two civil rights laws and the 
 
56Richard Cortner, Civil Rights and Public Accommodations: The Heart of Atlanta and 
McClung Cases (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 6, 29, 64; Benjamin 
Muse, The American Negro Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1968), 
75, 156-57.  I of course do not deny the extensive efforts against segregation in public 
accommodations in the 19th century and earlier in the 20th.  Integrationists certainly had many 
successes at the state and local levels.  But they did not for a long time manage national 
successes.  There was a considerable break between the 1875 Civil Rights Act and that of 1964. 
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Voting Rights Act of 1965, and numerous court challenges, before the first African-American 
members of Congress were elected from the 20th century South, in 1972.   The judicial backlash 
of Beer v. U.S. and Mobile v. Bolden, in 1976 and 1980, respectively,57 was partially reversed in 
the renewed Voting Rights Act of 1982, but minority political rights suffered a series of grave 
defeats beginning with Shaw v. Reno in 1993.58  The hostility of a 5-4 Supreme Court majority 
climaxed in the Court’s 2013 declaration that the coverage scheme for the requirement that some 
state and local jurisdictions “pre-clear” changes in their election laws before putting them into 
effect was so unfair to the white South as to deny an implicit constitutional principle of “equal 
[state] sovereignty.”59  The majority believed that what George Wallace would have termed 
“states’ rights” outweighed the explicitly-stated principle of equal protection of the law, 
 
57Beer, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), held that changes in election laws could only be denied 
“pre-clearance” under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act if they made minorities worse off than 
under the previous law, not merely if the laws had a discriminatory effect.  Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 
(1980), ruled that election laws could be declared illegal under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act only if it was proven that they had a discriminatory intent, not merely when a discriminatory 
effect was shown. 
58509 U.S. 630 (1993).  Shaw held that whites had standing to challenge a “racial 
gerrymander” in favor of minorities even if they could not prove that the districting scheme 
injured them.  On this and related legal cases, see generally, Kousser, Colorblind Injustice; 
Kousser, “The Strange, Ironic Career of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act,” Texas Law 
Review, 86 (2008), 667-775. 
59Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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guaranteed to individuals by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, regardless of the 
individuals’ race. 
 “Deliberate speed” in the desegregation of schools was very slow, indeed, until Health, 
Education, and Welfare Department directives in 1967 and the Supreme Court’s “root and 
branch” Green v. New Kent County decision in 1968.60  The 1971 Swann case in Charlotte 
increased the pace of desegregation, but in 1974, Milliken v. Bradley slowed it markedly by 
adopting a judicial ban on requiring integration across school district lines.61   In 2007, the same 
5-4 majority on the Supreme Court that later protected state and local power to dilute the votes of 
racial minorities struck down state and local power to take any action to integrate public  
 
60Green outlawed “freedom of choice” plans that had been used to delay desegregation, 
ruling that racial discrimination had to be “eliminated root and branch.” 391 U.S. 430, at 438 
(1968). 
61The best introduction is a series of books by Gary Orfield, some with coauthors: The 
Reconstruction of Southern Education: The Schools and the 1964 Civil Rights Act (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1969); Must We Bus?  Segregated Schools and National Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978); The Closing Door: Conservative Policy and 
Black Opportunity (Chicago: Univeersity of Chicago Press, 1991);  Dismantling Desegregation: 
The Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education (New York: New Press, 1996); School 
Resegregation: Must the South Turn Back? (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005); Lessons in Integration: Realizing the Promise of Racial Diversity in 
American Schools (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2007). 
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schools.62  
 Housing discrimination, more widespread than public accommodations restrictions 
before Brown, has been linked since then with the integration of schools.  Despite numerous state 
and a few national laws against housing bias, it continues strong, anchored in the self-interest of 
Anglos who fear that having “too many” minorities in a neighborhood will signal deterioration, 
eroding their investments.63 
 Job discrimination has been easier to attack and monitor, at least in large organizations, 
especially public ones, and despite the fact that members of different races working side by side 
in conditions of relative equality would seem most threatening to the social and economic status 
of the groups initially on top, factories and offices seem much more integrated than homes or 
schools.  Affirmative action laws have worked just as a reader of Strange Career would have 
predicted.64 
 
62Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
63Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making 
of the Underclass (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993); and for a more 
current overview, Vincent J. Roscigno, Diana L. Karafin, and Griff Tester, “The Complexities 
and Processes of Racial Housing Discrimination,” Social Problems, 56 (2009), 49-69. 
64The best sources are many papers by economist James Heckman, many with coauthors, 
including “The Impact of the Economy and the State on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study 
of South Carolina,” in David Galenson, ed., Markets and Institutions (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 321-43; “Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy 
on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina,” American Economic Review 
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 Although southern racists who played the sex card so long and so loudly would be as 
amazed as they would be appalled, anti-racial-intermarriage laws were the easiest to overthrow, 
dissolving in the Loving case of 1967, with remarkably little protest, and not a shred of the 
predicted cultural terror.65 
 One new, or rather, expanded form of discrimination has arisen, the incarceration, 
primarily through arrests for possession of narcotics, of as many as a quarter of young black 
men, blighting their subsequent employment opportunities, reducing the black vote through felon 
disfranchisement laws, and, because of its severe disruption of the black nuclear family and 
 
(1989), 138-77; “Affirmative Action and Black Employment,” Proceedings of the Industrial 
Relations Research Association, 41 (1989), 320-29; “The Central Role of the South in 
Accounting for the Economic Progress of Black Americans,” Papers and Proceedings of the 
American Economic Association (1990),; “Racial Disparity and Employment Discrimination 
Law: An Economic Perspective,” Yale Law and Policy Review (1990), 276-98; “Continuous vs. 
Episodic Change: The Impact of Affirmative Action and Civil Rights Policy on the Economic 
Status of Blacks,” Journal of Economic Literature (1991), 1603-43. 
65388 U.S. 1 (1967).  See Peter Wallenstein, Tell the Court I Love My Wife: Race, 
Marriage, and Law – An American History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).  By 2012, 
only about 10% of the American public thought that increased racial intermarriage had been bad 
for American society, and 17.1% of black newlyweds married someone of a different race. See 
Wendy Wang, “The Rise of Intermarriage: Rates, Characteristics Vary by Race and Gender,” 
Pew Research, Feb. 16, 2012,  available at <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-
rise-of-intermarriage/2/#chapter-1-overview>. 
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interruption of African-American wealth accumulation, damaging the prospects of subsequent 
generations.66 
 These different facets of the Jim Crow system have unraveled at different rates and to 
different extents, I suggest, because race relations are not segregated from other interests and 
values, and because they are affected by different, sometimes changing institutional constraints. 
Two schematic figures may serve to emphasize the forces outside of what we normally consider 
race relations, the institutional barriers to or drivers of racial equality, and the possibility that 
changes in the forces, as well as the institutions, may bring about racial change. 
 Figure 1 portrays the system of public accommodations segregation laws and the forces 
that maintained and then disrupted that system.  On the left of the diagram are two forces, the 
ideology of white supremacy and its relevant economic manifestation, the willingness of whites 
to pay more for segregated trains, restaurants, hotels than they would have had to if the consumer 
bases of those accommodations were larger, by allowing African-Americans to partake of them.  
In fact, whites managed to shift most of these costs to blacks by providing blacks with only 
inferior facilities, such as second-class train cars, inferior hotels, etc.  On the right of the diagram 
are forces pushing for more equality, Myrdal’s “American Creed” of equal opportunity and the 
desire of businesspersons for the higher revenues that more customers would bring.  There are 
two arrows pointing from each of the factors on the left, because during the era of Jim Crow, 
they were stronger than the factors on the right.  As segregation became more expensive to 
maintain, especially when African-Americans boycotted downtown stores during the sit-ins, and 
 
66Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2011) 
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as the Civil Rights Movement so skillfully drew attention to the American Creed, the forces on 
the left eroded, and those on the right strengthened.  When the segregation laws, which had 
almost all been repealed in the North in the 19th century, were overturned by the national courts, 
a force from outside the South, and integrated public accommodations were mandated, the forces 
of white supremacist ideology were no longer enough to maintain segregation, and whites’ 
behavior, especially that of owners of businesses, shifted very rapidly. 
 
(Figure 1 about here.) 
 
 Figure 2 schematizes the system that disfranchised and eventually re-enfranchised 
African-Americans in the South.  Again, the white supremacist and equal opportunity ideologies 
confronted each other, and nationally, at least for voting, they seem to have been approximately 
balanced throughout the period from 1870 on.  What determined the fate of disfranchisement 
measures, it seems to me, was not so much racial attitudes per se as the shifting interests of the 
Democratic and Republican parties, both in the South and in the nation, and three institutional 
constraints: Supreme Court opinions, the filibuster in the U.S. Senate, and the federal system that 
restrained national government power over state voting regulations.  Once African-Americans 
were enfranchised in the South in 1867, Democrats could not secure national victory if southern 
blacks voted without restraint and those votes were counted as cast. Consequently, no Democrat 
in the U.S. Congress cast a single vote for any nineteenth century civil rights measure after the 
thirteenth amendment, and northern Democrats became the pivotal defenders of southern 
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electoral violence and disfranchisement.67  Republican party interest in southern black votes, 
very high during Reconstruction, moderated particularly after the party’s northern sweep in the 
1894 elections.  The interests of southern whites, particularly elite southern whites, in not paying 
the taxes that would have been required to finance equal public services for African-Americans 
added policy content to prejudice, and from the 1880s or 90s until the 1950s and 60s, it 
outweighed the countervailing push among blacks for expanded services and the higher taxes 
required to finance them.   
 
(Figure 2 about here.) 
 
 But what Figure 2 most emphasizes is the importance of the three institutional factors in 
facilitating and later, reversing suffrage restrictions. First, the Supreme Court’s opinions in the 
Reese and Cruikshank cases in 1876 hamstrung the 1870-71 national Supervisory Laws,68 and its 
1898 and 1903 opinions in Williams v. Mississippi and Giles v. Harris made it much more 
 
67Kousser, Colorblind Injustice, 39. 
68See my review of Robert M. Goldman, Reconstruction and Black Suffrage: Losing the 
Vote in Reese and Cruikshank, <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cqi? 
path=179141046324369>.  Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), required that the government 
charge and prove that the seventy or so African-Americans who died in the “Colfax Massacre” 
were murdered because of their race.  Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) ruled that the discriminatory use 
of a voting requirement was not illegal because the Section 3 of 1870 Enforcement Act did not 
repeat an earlier statement in the law that the discrimination had to be by race. 
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difficult to attack southern state constitutional suffrage restrictions.69  In bookend fashion, a later 
Supreme Court’s decisions outlawed the white primary and facilitated attacks on state 
restrictions, as well as validating the national Voting Rights Act.70  Of these decisions, only the 
last, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, represented a strong surge of national opinion; on the others, 
opinion was deeply (1876) or shallowly (1898, 1903, 1944) divided.  The Supreme Court is not a 
transparent conductor of some unified national public opinion; whatever they pretend, the 
justices make policy.  Second, the Senate filibuster killed the 1875 Elections Bill (“the Force 
Bill”), the 1890 Lodge Elections Bill (also called “the Force Bill”), and numerous anti-poll tax 
and anti-lynching bills through the 1940s.  Only a shift toward civil rights by the extraordinarily-
gifted and opportunistic legislative leader, Lyndon Johnson, and a residual warmth toward civil 
rights in the leadership of the Republican party beat civil rights filibusters in 1957, 1960, and 
1964.  A landslide Democratic election in 1964 passed the first effective national voting rights 
 
69See R. Volney Riser, Defying Disfranchisement: Black Voting Rights Activism in the 
Jim Crow South, 1890-1908 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2010).  
Williams, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) held that it was not enough to show that the Mississippi 
constitution of 1890 was intended to disfranchise blacks, unless it was proven to have that effect.  
Giles, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), held that a proof of both the discriminatory intent and effect of the 
1901 Alabama constitution was not enough; disfranchisement was a “political question,” not 
subject to judicial interference. 
70See Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 
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law in 94 years.71  Had the filibuster not been available as a tool, the forces promoting and 
maintaining black disfranchisement could not have prevailed, and even if they had, the forces 
pushing for franchise equality would have had much more incentive to make it a national issue 
sooner than the 1960s, because they would have had a much less difficult obstacle to overcome.  
Third, the last of the institutions that shaped the nation’s civil rights policies, federalism (the 
division of governmental powers between national and state governments), preserved most 
power over electoral rules to the states.  Courts often deferred to the states, even after the passage 
of the 14th and 15th amendments, and the density of state and local electoral regulations made it 
easy for those governments to engage in subtle discrimination and difficult for national 
authorities or federal judges to fashion tools to protect minority rights, even when they desired to 
intervene.  Without state semi-autonomy, uncommon in other countries, the white South could 
not, by itself, have disfranchised blacks or maintained a white electoral monopoly for so long 
and, on the other hand, northern African-Americans and their white allies could not have 
comprised an increasingly large and insistent voting bloc that pressed successfully for national 
voting rights laws in the 1950s and 60s.  Federalism both enabled black  disfranchisement and 
helped prepare the way to unravel it. 
 As five members of the Supreme Court invoke federalist principles to reverse the 
direction of voting rights law, and as Senate Republicans make unprecedented use of the 
filibuster to block legislation and executive and judicial nominations that they oppose, the history 
of the way these institutions have been used to contract and then expand minority voting rights 
should be of increased interest to the historical profession and the public. 
 
71Lawson, Black Ballots. 
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 Similar schematic figures could be proposed for other policies or areas of concern.  They 
would feature different values and interests – class, economic, gender, or religious, for example – 
they would involve different institutions, and they might model different outcomes, or at least 
similar outcomes at different times.  The point of the schemas is to remind us that race relations 
is never an autonomous sphere, that it always overlaps with other human concerns, and that 
institutions, which may inherently or originally have little to do with racial matters, may very 
directly shape racial policy.   
 The historiography of the Jim Crow Thesis may be faulted for engaging largely in pure 
descriptions of racial practices, unsystematically measured; for a concentration solely on racial 
and even gender attitudes as causes of racially-oriented behavior; for a refusal to take the 
possibility of less discriminatory policies seriously; and, most of all, for a failure to examine the 
influence and workings of institutions in shaping racial policy.  These intellectual mistakes 
should be avoided in any reconsideration of the Jim Crow Thesis, which is timely, as we seem to 
be transitioning to yet another era of race relations, moving backward, toward more racial 
segregation and more restrictions on minority voting rights. What differentiated the Jim Crow 
Era, what made discrimination in sphere after sphere solidify after 1890 and move synchronously 
for so long was the disfranchisement of African-Americans by law, a disfranchisement made 
possible only by the three institutional levers spotlighted in Figure 2.  The larger analysis 
presented above also suggests the benefits of extending the themes that Woodward introduced to 
the study of other systems of race relations.  
 
VI.  Deviations
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 But historians have largely abjured such investigations and the methods and theories of 
the social sciences that are necessary to carry them out, or even to understand the studies that 
social scientists do perform, and historians’ divergence from the path Woodward began to lay 
out has impeded any desires they might have had to affect public policy, directly or indirectly.  
The cultural turn in history and the disillusionment with politics and even the notion of truth that 
followed the disasters of 1968 (Paris, Prague, Mexico City, Chicago, and the assassinations of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy)72 helped to replace the history of race relations 
with two varieties of identity history: what might be called minority agency history and 
whiteness studies.   
 Although studies of  the history of non-white groups in America have many virtues, they 
often suffer from an inability or unwillingness to weigh the importance of their topics to larger 
national themes.  In rescuing their subjects from anonymity, scholars sometimes give way to the 
desire to make every person, every action, every topic profoundly influential – janitors as potent 
as judges, attending meetings as effective as passing laws, signing petitions as crucial to 
overthrowing slavery as lecturing to thousands.73  Just as important, minority history tends to 
 
72Joyce O. Appleby, Knowledge and Postmodernism in Historical Perspective (New 
York: Routledge, 1996). 
73E.g., Robin D.G. Kelley, “‘We Are Not What We Seem”: Rethinking Black Working 
Class Opposition in the Jim Crow South,” Journal of American History, 80 (1993), 75-112; Tera 
Hunter, To ‘Joy My Freedom’: Southern Black Women’s Lives and Labors After the Civil War 
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insulate its subjects, even to segregate them, as though a black economics, politics, or society 
could exist in America without being profoundly affected by the dominant white society or 
without having their own considerable effects on white groups.74  While the separate study of 
African-Americans, Native Americans, Latinos, and Asian-Americans will continue to make 
significant contributions, it is time that it paid more attention to the older topic of interactions 
among these groups and between these groups and Anglos, and it is well to remind ourselves 
again that to grant everyone agency is to deny anyone real power, which is profoundly unrealistic 
and, more important, unproductive for the larger, continuing struggle for equality. 
 If agency history is sometimes “feel good” history, whiteness studies is “feel bad” 
history, Ulrich B. Phillips’s “central theme” writ national, but spun differently, to induce guilt, 
instead of to celebrate triumph – consciousness-raising for the skin-privileged.75  It ignores 
 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Elsa Barkley Brown, “”Negotiating and 
Transforming the Public Sphere: African American Political Life in the Transition from Slavery 
to Freedom,” in Dailey et al., Jumpin’ Jim Crow, 28-66; C. Peter Ripley, Roy E. Finkenbine, 
Michael F. Hembree, and Donald Yacovone, eds., Witness for Freedom: African American 
Voices on Race, Slavery, and Emancipation (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1993).  For a gentle critique of such studies, see Barbara J. Fields, “Origins of the 
New South and the Negro Question,” Journal of Southern History, 67 (2001), 811-26. 
74E.g., Robin D.G. Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class 
(New York: Free Press, 1996). 
75In its focus on the northern white working class and immigrants who settled primarily 
  39 
systematic change and variation, ignores generations of social scientific studies of assimilation 
and group formation and divergence, ignores class, religious, and persistent ethnic divisions that 
often had large effects on the way non-whites and various white subgroups interacted, whether 
they were able to cooperate directly or indirectly, whether intra-racial divisions allowed 
minorities room for maneuver.76  Timeless and homogenized, too vague to test and too cultural 
to care, whiteness studies cannot contribute to the central task of the history of race – to bring 
about racial equality.  
 To supplement minority identity history, historians should take up more large-scale, 
comparative analyses of the rises and falls of ethnically discriminatory laws and practices of 
every sort, the explanations for those patterns, and the relationships between those patterns and 
other patterns of discrimination.  To give just two examples: Why did different southern states 
 
in the North, whiteness studies might be considered the Yankee counterpart of Williamson’s 
southern-focused Crucible of Race, discussed earlier. 
76See, e.g., Roediger, Wages of Whiteness; Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color; 
Michelle Brattain, The Politics of Whiteness: Race, Workers, and Culture in the Modern South 
(Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2004); Grace Elizabeth Hale, Making Whiteness: 
The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890-1940 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); George 
Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998); Ruth Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: 
The Social Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993). 
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adopt Jim Crow railroad and streetcar segregation laws at different times?  And how different 
were the patterns of the adoption of laws facilitating and constraining discrimination in jobs and 
property acquisition by race and by gender?  What do such patterns imply for larger questions of 
changes in racial and gender relations?  Fortunately, one virtue of federalism is that it provides 
us with a natural laboratory for assessing such questions.  Statisticians have provided the tools, 
tools historians have yet to discover, but which they need, for there is much productive work to 
be done.77 
 
VII.  Dedication 
 Today, as much as seventy-five years ago, when Woodward began his historical career, 
the world needs changing, and just as much as then, historians’ work can help foster desirable – 
or undesirable – change.  Indeed, in areas of history that affect or potentially affect public policy, 
we can be sure that versions of history will be employed, often the biased history of policy 
gladiators, whether professional historians, trained in the healthy critical give and take that 
sharpens the discipline, choose to enter the arena or not.  Professional reticence will not mean 
that history isn’t used, only that it will be used badly.  When Chief Justice John Roberts 
 
77See Kousser, “‘Onward March of Right Principles;’”Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and 
Bradford S. Jones, Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Anthony Y. Chen, The Fifth Freedom: Jobs, Politics, and 
Civil Rights in the United States, 1941-1972 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2009). 
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announced in Parents Involved that “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race,”78 he may have been merely restating a “colorblind” 
ideological statement as a catch-phrase.  But he could also be taken to have offered an empirical, 
potentially testable generalization: Is the reason that racial discrimination in education and other 
areas of social life has declined since the 1950s that government began to ignore race in framing 
regulations?  To put it more generally, does legally-explicit discrimination between persons 
because of race or ethnicity always and inevitably lead to discrimination against members of 
disadvantaged minority groups?   Or in the Shelby County voting rights case, Chief Justice 
Roberts condemned the coverage scheme that required certain jurisdictions, particularly those in 
the Deep South, to submit changes in election laws for preclearance as “a formula based on 40-
year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”79  He did not, however, consider 
whether the formula had an empirical relation to present-day discrimination.  Historians might 
have much important research to contribute to the examination of the questions raised by the 
Chief Justice’s unevidenced assertions, as they have done so usefully in contributing amicus 
curiae briefs to the Supreme Court in gay rights and gun control cases and as they have 
attempted to do in recent voting rights cases.80   
 
78Parents Involved in Community Schools, 748, is briefly discussed in Section IV, above. 
79Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013), slip opinion at 21-22. 
80See “Brief of the Organization of American Historians and the American Studies 
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.Ct. 
2432 (2013);  <http://38.106.4.56/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentID=1196>; “Brief of 
  42 
 Of course, the principal means of communication for historians are articles and 
monographs and courses.  And there is plenty of work for historians to do not only in 
reexamining the original intent of ordinances, statutes, and constitutional provisions, charting the 
development of and attacks on minority rights, commenting and testifying, but also in deepening 
public and student understanding of the context and background in which the events took place.  
The fulfillment of such public duties – the reconstruction of the civic purpose of the profession -- 
should be publicly recognized and encouraged by the history profession, instead of, as at present, 
ignored or, as it was by several of Woodward’s critics, derided.81  
 
Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove, Saul Cornell, David t. Konig, William J. Novak, Lois G. 
Schwoerer et al., in Support of Petitioner,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 579 (2008), 
<http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/07-290_amicus_historians.pdf>;   
“Brief Amici Curiae of Historians and Other Scholars in Support of Petitioners,” Crawford v. 
Marion County, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), 
<http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Rokita-
BriefamicuscuriaeofHistorians.pdf>; “Brief of Historians and Social Scientists as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents,” Shelby County v. Holder, <http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/12-96bsacHistoriansSocialScientists.pdf > 
81According to Kevin Mattson, “History Lesson: Those who don’t know history are 
doomed to distort it – and our political discourse,” Democracy (Winter, 2006), 79-87 
<http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6506> , “To be ‘presentist,’ to care about 
what the public is thinking and worried about and to try to shed historical light on such concerns, 
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 Woodward inspired, marched in Montgomery, testified in Congress, all without 
compromising his commitment to the highest standards of scholarship.  That his scholarship had 
effects at the highest levels of power and in ways he could not have initially foreseen may be 
illustrated by a simple anecdote.  When Woodward and I testified on June 24, 1981 before the 
House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights in favor of 
renewing and strengthening the Voting Rights Act, the presiding officer much of the time was a 
freshman congressman from Chicago named Harold Washington.  That afternoon, I was sitting 
in the audience listening to further testimony by eminent voting rights lawyers when Rep. 
Washington took a long walk from behind the dais to sit down next to me and ask whether Prof. 
Woodward was still around.  After I explained that Woodward had returned to New Haven to 
care for his wife, who was ill, Washington, two years from becoming Chicago’s first and only 
black mayor, remarked how honored he had been to listen to Woodward, whose Strange Career 
of Jim Crow, he said, he had read in college and been inspired by ever since.  Those of us who 
wish to honor C. Vann Woodward’s legacy have much to do.  We might start by re-dedicating 
ourselves to his principles. 
 
is [for historians] to perform career suicide.” (81) By contrast, Mattson’s model in the article of 
what a historian should do is Woodward’s Strange Career. 









         
 
Figure 1:  Forces and Institutional Barriers  
Preventing Public Accommodations Integration 
white supremacy 
      ideology equal opportunity 
       ideology 
white willingness 
  to pay for black 
     inequality 
expanded customer 
  base for business 
Segregation laws 
gaps in North 




Democratic party interest 
low taxes, discriminatory  
       services 
Figure 2:  Institutions, Values, and Interests in Black Voting Rights 
Supreme Court Decisions Federalism 
white supremacy ideology equal opportunity ideology 
Republican party interest 
Black political power 
Disfranchisement Laws 
